Neo-Nazism and discrimination against foreigners: A direct test of taste discrimination by Nils Braakmann
 
 
Neo-Nazism and discrimination against foreigners:  
 
A direct test of taste discrimination 
University of Lüneburg 








ISSN 1860 - 5508 
by 
Nils Braakmann 
   1
Neo-Nazism and discrimination against foreigners: A direct test of taste discrimination 
Nils Braakmann
* 
Leuphana University Lüneburg 
 
[This version March 17
th, 2010] 
Abstract: 
I test some predictions of Gary Becker’s theory of taste discrimination regarding 
discrimination of foreigners by employers, co-workers and customers. I combine a 2% sample 
of the German working population and a 50% sample of German plants with low-level 
regional data, including the vote shares of three right-wing parties as a proxy for regional 
racism. The results show that (a) foreigner-native wage differentials rise with the share of 
right-wing voters, (b) the exact magnitude of the effects varies between skill groups and by 
gender, the largest effects being found for high-skilled men and women, (c) average 
employment shares of natives vary very little with the share of right-wing voters, (d) 
segregated firms become more common in manufacturing and construction when support for 
right-wing parties rises, while no effects are found for services and gastronomy and (e) the 
negative wage effects are strongest for foreigners working in services, while no effects are 
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found in manufacturing and gastronomy. These results broadly confirm the predictions from 
taste discrimination. 
Keywords: taste discrimination, segregated firms, wage differentials 
JEL Classification: J23, J31, J71 
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I. Introduction 
In this paper, I test some of the predictions from Gary Becker’s seminal book The 
Economics of Discrimination (Becker, 1957/1971), in which he formalized the idea of racism 
and prejudices against socio-economic groups in an economic framework based on 
preferences and market structures. The basic idea behind his theory is that prejudices against a 
certain socio-economic group translate into a lower willingness to pay for the labor of that 
group (employer discrimination), higher wage demand of workers who have to work 
alongside that socio-economic group (co-worker discrimination) or a lower willingness to pay 
for goods and services when this involves contact with the members of the discriminated 
group (customer discrimination).  
Many economists have tested the empirical implications of this theory. One of the 
major difficulties faced by empirical researchers is the fact that tastes are typically unobserved. 
Most of the literature on discrimination (surveyed, e.g., in Cain, 1986 and Altonji and Blank, 
1999) has thus resorted to calculating discrimination as a residual difference between the 
wages of the respective majority and minority after accounting for differences in productivity 
using, e.g., Oaxaca-Blinder-decompositions.
1 The usual and well-documented problem with 
these estimates is that it is usually unclear whether all productivity relevant characteristics 
have been controlled for and whether the resulting residual is due to discrimination or due to 
unobserved factors (see Kunze, 2008, for a discussion in the context of gender wage 
inequalities). 
In this paper, I use a direct measure of regional anti-foreigner prejudices to test several 
predictions of taste discrimination, specifically the combined vote share of three extreme 
right-wing parties in Germany, the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD), the 
                                                 
1 Other approaches involve either field experiments (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004), 
more classical audit studies or natural experiments (e.g., Goldin and Rouse, 2000).   4
Deutsche Volksunion (DVU) and the Republikaner (REP), in the Federal elections of 1998, 
2002 and 2005.
2  Note that “right-wing” in this context refers to the anti-foreigner, often 
borderline neo-fascist parties prevalent in Europe since a few decades. All three parties used 
here have a strong anti-immigration/anti-foreigner program with at least the NPD often 
crossing the border to open neo-fascism/neo-Nazism. In fact, DVU and NPD as well as parts 
of the Republikaner are under surveillance by Germany’s domestic intelligence agency, the 
Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, for being a threat to Germany’s democracy and 
constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, 2008). The fact that voters of these parties 
are typically prejudiced against foreigners is well documented in studies by political scientists 
demonstrating that anti-immigration sentiments play a major role in the decision to vote for 
these and similar parties (see, e.g., Arzheimer, 2008, and the literature cited therein). 
Additionally, increases in the vote shares of these parties have been shown to decrease the 
well-being of foreigners (Knabe et al, 2009). Using election data to measure regional racism, 
as opposed to, e.g., opinion surveys, has the advantage that voters have low incentives to hide 
their true preferences towards foreigners. This is not necessarily true for opinion surveys, 
where respondents might act in a socially acceptable way when answering the questions. 
Additionally, election data are available on a lowly aggregated regional level. 
I combine the election data with additional regional information from official statistics 
and merge these with a 2% sample of the German working population and a 50% sample of 
German plants. The micro data used are panel data taken from social security records, which 
                                                 
2 Note that the 2005 election was regularly scheduled for 2006. However, then-chancellor 
Gerhard Schröder used a parliamentary procedure, the Vertrauensfrage, to dissolve the 
German parliament and provoke earlier elections. The reasons for this decision were unrelated 
to any of the right-wing parties used here or any event relevant to the question investigated in 
this paper.   5
allows me to control for unobserved individual, county and firm heterogeneity in some 
estimations. A detailed description of the data can be found in section II. 
In a second step, I examine whether foreigner-native wage differentials and firm 
segregation rise in the number of individuals leaning to right-wing parties and whether there 
are wage and employment differences with respect to proxies for customer contact. The main 
underlying assumption of my estimates is that a foreigner’s probability to encounter a 
prejudiced employer as well as the share of prejudiced workers and customers rises in the 
share of right wing voters in a certain region.  
The only paper I am aware of that uses regional data to test some of the direct 
predictions of Becker’s theory is Charles and Guryan (2008) who combine information on 
regional racial prejudices from the General Social Survey with CPS data and focus on 
employer discrimination and black-white wage differentials.
3  Their findings suggest the 
expected relationship between the level of prejudice of the marginal employer and black 
wages. They also find that increases in prejudice matter only when less prejudiced individuals 
become more prejudiced, which is also in line with the predictions from Becker’s theory. In 
contrast, this paper also considers some of the predictions regarding co-worker and customer 
discrimination. As far as I am aware of, this paper is in fact the first to test predictions for all 
three types of discrimination simultaneously. The big advantage of this approach is that it 
allows for a sharper test of the underlying theory. While one could always find competing 
explanations for any of the predictions alone, alternative theories become less likely the more 
predictions of taste discrimination are not rejected by the data.  
                                                 
3 Two other papers, Cutler et al. (1999) and Card et al (2008) find that regional attitudes 
towards foreigners/minorities influence residential racial segregation. However, they do not 
look at labor market discrimination. 
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In the first step of the econometric analysis in section III. I test for the existence of 
foreigner-native wage and employment differentials and their relationship with the extent of 
regional racism. A potential problem with the election data in this analysis is that they are 
only informative about the share of very prejudiced individuals in a county. As equilibrium 
wage differentials in Becker’s theory are based on the prejudice of the marginal employer (see 
also Charles and Guryan, 2008), that is the employer who hires the last foreigner in a world 
where foreigners sort themselves into the least prejudiced firms first, I am likely to understate 
the true effect of prejudice on wages. However, note that high vote shares of extremely right-
wing parties might also measure larger prejudice shifts in the respective region, which also 
influence the marginal employer. Indirect evidence for this idea has been found by, e.g., 
Arzheimer and Carter (2006) who document a positive correlation between the vote share of 
extreme right parties share and a farther right ideological position of the major mainstream 
party. In fact, the qualitative predictions from Becker’s theory regarding employer 
discrimination are confirmed in my analysis – at least for females and high-qualified males. I 
also find some evidence that the employment prospects of foreigners are worsened by 
increases in the right-wing vote shares, which would be the expected results if wage rigidities 
prevent a full adjustment of foreigners’ wages. However, employment effects are generally 
very small. 
In a second step, I look at plant homogeneity in terms of nationality using a simple 
index that distinguishes between foreigners and natives as well as a more elaborate measure 
that also allows for heterogeneity of foreigners with different nationalities. Homogenous 
plants can arise if employers have no racial preference, but workers in plants are prejudiced. 
In this case, workers would demand higher wages when having to work alongside members of 
the discriminated group. For employers, it becomes consequently optimal to hire only workers 
from one group, thus creating segregated workplaces where contact between the different 
nationalities is reduced. Another possibility are prejudiced employers who only hire the group   7
of workers that is relatively cheapest (after adjusting for the possible discomfort of employing 
foreigners in the case of prejudiced employers). Here, my analysis shows that in the cross-
section right-wing votes and measures of plant segregation are positively correlated. When 
controlling for plant and county heterogeneity, this effects disappears when looking at all 
industries. However, right-wing votes have a strong positive influence on plant segregation in 
manufacturing and construction, whereas weaker effects are found in services and gastronomy. 
Results of this analysis can be found in section IV. 
Finally, in section V, I consider the question whether wage and employment 
differentials differ with customer contact. Specifically, I investigate whether foreigner-native 
wage differentials have a different relationship with the share of right-wing voters in 
industries requiring personal contact with customers, e.g., gastronomy or services, than in 
industries which require less or no personal contact with customers, e.g., manufacturing. I 
also consider the question whether such firms are more likely to hire natives than foreigners 
in these cases. Here, my results suggest that a rise in regional racism leads to a (relative) 
decline in foreigners’ wages working in services, but not in manufacturing or gastronomy. 
This result is in line with expectations for services and manufacturing, but – at least at a first 
glance – not for gastronomy, where personal contact with customers is common. A prime 
difference between gastronomy and services, however, is that foreignness is often a desirable 
characteristic of restaurants. In other words, we can imagine that even a prejudiced person 
who frowns upon the though of getting his hair cut by a foreigner might prefer his Pizza being 
prepared by an Italian chef, which in turn should reduce the extent of customer discrimination 
in gastronomy. 
II. Data 
A. Person-level data 
The individual level data used in this study come from the so called employment panel 
of the Federal Employment Agency (BA- Beschäftigtenpanel) for the years 1998, 2002 and   8
2005., which are the years where Federal elections were held. Specific information on an 
earlier version of the employment panel can be found in Koch and Meinken (2004), the 
current version is described (in German) in Schmucker and Seth (2009). 
The individual data originate from social security information and is collected in the 
so called employee history by the Federal Employment Agency.
4 In Germany, employers are 
obliged by German law to deliver annual information on their employees, as well as 
additional information at the beginning and end of an employment, to social security. These 
notifications are used to calculate pensions, as well as contributions to and benefits from 
health and unemployment insurance. The data contain information on the beginning and end 
of employment, daily wages, a person’s age and sex, as well as several variables collected for 
statistical purposes, e.g. education or nationality. The resulting spell data cover approximately 
75 - 80% of the German workforce, excluding free-lancers, the self-employed, civil servants 
and (unpaid) workers helping in family businesses (Koch and Meinken 2004, p. 317). Note 
that this fact prevents me from analyzing the relationship between discrimination and self-
employment, as for instance done by Borjas and Bronars (1989). 
The employment panel is drawn from the employee history in a two step procedure. 
First, all persons born on one of seven specified dates are selected. As the German social 
security number is tied to the date of birth and does not change over time, it is possible to 
track those persons over time. Additionally, entries in and exits from the labor force are 
automatically covered by this procedure as new entrants born on one of these dates replace 
persons leaving the labor force. In a second step, the panel is formed by drawing four cross-
sections per year – on the last day of March, June, September and December respectively – 
                                                 
4 More information on person-level data from German social security records can be found in 
Bender at al. (2000). 
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from this data. Finally, if a person receives unemployment benefits or is in an active labor 
market program on one of those days, an artificial observation indicating this fact is generated 
from other data sources of the Federal Employment Agency. The resulting panel is 
unbalanced due to entries into and exits from the labor force. However, there is no missing 
information due to non-response. As most records in the data are based on the annual 
notifications to social security, which means that there is essentially no wage variation within 
the year for these observations, this study uses only the last observation available for each 
year. 
The data also contain information on the county (Kreis or Kreisfreie Stadt) where the 
worker’s employer is located and that can be used to merge regional information with the data. 
A German Kreis is similar to the US counties in the hierarchy of public administration. It is 
the third highest level of administration, placed above the communal level, but below the 
Federal States (Bundesländer) and the country administration, the Bund. A county usually 
covers several towns or villages (Kreis) or one large city (Kreisfreie Stadt). In two cases, 
Berlin and Hamburg, it is also identical to the Federal State (Bundesland).  
Low-skilled workers are defined as workers without post-school training, regardless of 
the amount of secondary schooling, while skilled workers have completed vocational training 
and high-skilled workers are those with an academic degree. I also calculate potential 
experience as age - 6 - the usual years of schooling associated with a certain degree, where 6 
is the usual school-starting age in Germany 
To arrive at the estimation sample, I first drop persons younger than 25 and older than 
55 to avoid problems with ongoing education and early retirement. I further restrict the 
sample to regular, full time workers, dropping trainees, home and part-time workers as well as 
the unemployed. Wages that are top-coded at the contribution limit to social security are   10
imputed using a Tobit-based imputation as described in Gartner (2005).
5 Finally, I drop the 
bottom 1% of the wage distribution to control for outliers. The resulting sample covers 
528,329 person-year-observations from 249,404 men and 430,140 observations from 218,036 
women. Descriptive statistics can be found in Table 1.  
(TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE.) 
B. Firm-level data 
The firm level data used here are a 50% sample of the population of German plants 
that employ at least one worker subject to social security contributions (effectively excluding 
only single person entrepreneurs and most government agencies), the Establishment History 
Panel (see Spengler, 2008, for details and Spengler, 2009, for the codebook and 
documentation). The data have been formed by aggregating social security records at the plant 
level and are provided and maintained by the research data center of the Federal Employment 
Agency in the Institute of Employment Research. Note that the data can be linked over time 
using plant identifiers, resulting in a panel data set from 1975 (West Germany) and 1992 (East 
Germany) onwards. 
The data contain detailed information on industry and the workforce composition of 
the plant, including, e.g., the shares of workers with certain educational degrees, with various 
                                                 
5 The imputation procedure essentially adds a draw from a truncated normal distribution to 
each censored wage. The parameters of the distribution are estimated from the data by Tobit 
regressions that are conducted separately for each year. The imputation affects 25,230 out of 
334,969 West German and 1,122 out of 38,212 East German observations in 1998, 1,723 out 
of 396,250 (West) respectively 121 out of 36,089 observations (East) in 2002 and 21,337 out 
of 357,655 observations (West) and 2,756 out of 46,206 observations (East) in 2005. The 
changing share of affected individuals is related to changes in the contribution limit to social 
security over the years.   11
occupational positions, in certain age groups or with a certain nationality (see Spengler, 2009, 
for a full list) as well as quartiles of the age and wage distribution. However, there is no 
information on average wages as the wage data are top censored at the contribution limit to 
social security. The data also do not contain any information on firm performance variables, 
like profitability, output, sales, exports or revenue. Additionally, there is also no information 
on physical capital. However, the administrative nature of the data ensures that there is 
generally no item non-response. Similar to the person level data, the data contain regional 
identifiers, specifically the county where the plant is located. This information is again used to 
merge regional data with the firm level information. Using all available observations for the 
years 1998, 2002 and 2005 yields a sample of 2,379,061 observations from 935,924 plants. 
Descriptive information can be found in table 2. 
(TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE.) 
C. Regional data 
The regional data used here originate from various sources from official statistics (see 
table 3 for a list and descriptive statistics). All data, except for the vote shares, can be 
accessed through the website www.regionalstatistik.de, which is operated by the Federal 
Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Federal States. The election data was 
obtained directly from the Federal election supervisor (Bundeswahlleiter), situated at the 
Federal Statistical Office. 
From the election data, I calculate two measures of regional racism. The first is simply 
the combined vote share of the three major right-wing parties in Germany, defined as the 
share of right-wing votes in the total number of valid votes cast.
6  As this measure is 
                                                 
6 This uses the so-called Zweitstimme. In the German system each voter has two votes, one for 
a regional candidate (the Erststimme) and one for a particular party list that is determined at 
the level of the Bundesländer. The Zweitstimme determines the number of seats a party   12
influenced by voter turnover, I also calculate a second measure, which is the share of right-
wing voters in the country’s adult, native population. I will typically refer to these measures 
jointly as the “share of right-wing voters”, except for cases where this may lead to ambiguities. 
From the election data, I also obtain a measure for voter turnout, specifically the share of 
eligible voters who actually participated in the election, which can be seen as a proxy for 
good citizenship and also influences the relative success of the right-wing parties. 
(TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE.) 
Additionally, I take a number of potentially relevant control variables from various 
official sources. I proxy regional economic conditions by the gross national product per head 
and the share of employed individuals in the working age population as (bad) employment 
prospects have been shown to be major determinant of right-wing votes (Falk et al., 2009). 
Note that using the unemployment quota instead is difficult in this case as there has been a 
major change in definition with the introduction of the Hartz-reforms in 2005, which does not 
necessarily influence measured unemployment in all counties equally.  
The regional supply of foreigners is approximated using simply the share of foreigners 
in the county’s population, with foreigners being defined as individuals without a German 
nationality. Controlling for these is also important as there is evidence that the share of 
foreigners influences attitudes and harassment towards foreigners, although the direction of 
the relationship differs across studies (e.g., Krueger and Pischke, 1997, for Germany; Green et 
al., 1998, for New York City; Dustmann et al., 2004, or the UK). 
                                                                                                                                                          
receives in parliament and is less influenced by the respective county’s candidate, whose 
qualities are unobserved. The fact that party lists vary across Bundesländer and election years 
implies that regressions should control for Bundesland-year-interactions to account for 
unobserved candidate/list heterogeneity.   13
I also control for the share of native young men below 25 years of age in the native 
population as these are the socio-economic groups most likely to commit racist crimes 
(Neubacher, 1998; Willems et al., 1993). Additionally, I add controls for the share of men and 
young people below 25 years of age in the native population. Finally, I control for the number 
of school leavers with at most a Hauptschul-degree, the lowest of three secondary school 
degrees that can be obtained in Germany.  
III. Foreigner-native wage and employment differentials 
To fix thoughts, consider a competitive market setting without discrimination where 
workers are paid according to their productivity. Let wages be denoted as w
N for native 
workers and as w
F for foreign workers. A prejudiced employer has a distaste for employing 
foreign workers and will act as if their true wage were w
F + d, where d is a measure for the 
strength of his prejudice. In other words, a prejudiced employer will only hire foreigners if 
they are (a) more productive than natives at the same wage rate or (b) willing to work for less 
money if they are equally productive. The extent to which wage differentials are observed in 
equilibrium depends on the relative supply of prejudiced employers and foreigners. If there 
are relatively few prejudiced employers and relatively few foreigners, it is likely that 
foreigners are able to sort themselves into non-discriminating firms, where they do not suffer 
wage penalties. Hence, wage differentials can only be observed if the last employer that hires 
a foreigner is still prejudiced. This in turn implies that prejudice shifts among the less-
prejudiced employers should matter more for wage differentials than changes in average 
prejudice or changes among the more prejudiced workers (see Charles and Guryan, 2008).  
This fact poses a problem for the analysis conducted here as right-wing voters are very 
likely among the most prejudiced persons in a given county, which means that changes in the 
right-wing vote share are most informative about changes in the right tail of the prejudice 
distribution. However, evidence from political scientists (e.g., Arzheimer and Carter, 2006) 
suggests that a high vote share of extreme right parties share goes hand in hand with a farther   14
right ideological position of the major mainstream party. This in turn suggests that changes in 
the vote shares of right-wing parties might approximate more general changes in prejudice 
among the population. In fact, the results of my empirical analysis broadly confirm the 
predictions of Becker’s theory. However, one should keep in mind that my estimates very 
likely represent lower bounds. 
In the first step of the empirical analysis, I test the hypothesis that foreign workers 
receive lower wages in regions/years where discrimination, as approximated by the votes for 
right-wing parties, is high. For this purpose, I use wage regressions of the form 
Ln(wageict) = ηi + ζc + β’Xit + δ’Wct + θ*(Bundesland*year) + λ*RWct + τ*(RWct*foreignert) 
+ εict.,             (1) 
where wageict is the monthly real wage of individual i in county c at time t, ηi and ζc 
capture individual and county level heterogeneity, Xit contains time varying individual 
controls, specifically age, potential experience and education dummies for being low-skilled, 
skilled or high-skilled. Wct contains the regional control variables described in section II.C. θ 
is a set of Bundesland-year-interactions that account for the fact that a party’s candidate list 
varies across Bundesländer and elections, which might influence the vote shares. RWct is 
either the vote share of right-wing parties or the share of right-wing voters in the population in 
the respective county and election. λ allows the wages of natives to vary with regional 
discrimination and τ is the relative wage gap between foreigners and natives per unit increase 
in the measure of regional prejudice. I also estimate equation (1) separately for low-skilled, 
skilled and high-skilled workers. As some regressors vary only at the county level, all 
standard errors are adjusted for clustering on that level to avoid the Moulton-problem 
(Moulton, 1990). 
If wage rigidities prevent the adjustment of foreigners’ wages, we would expect 
employers’ prejudices to show up in their hiring decisions instead of wages. To test this 
possibility, I use firm-level data and estimate the regression   15
Share of nativesict = α + ζc + β’Xit + δ’Wct + θ*(Bundesland*year) + τ*RWct + εic,  (2) 
where  ζc again captures regional heterogeneity, θ contain Bundesland-year-fixed 
effects, Wct are the usual county-level control variables and X it contains firm-level control 
variables, specifically firm age, firm age squared, firm size, firm size squared, the shares of 
women, white- and blue-collar workers, the shares of high- and low-qualified workers and the 
shares of workers below 30, between 40 and 54 and above 54 years of age. Note that these 
estimates do not control for firm fixed effects as these would capture most of an employer’s 
eventual prejudice. Remember further that the share of foreigners living in the respective 
county is held constant. Our parameter of interest is τ that tells us how the average 
employment share of natives in a county varies with the share of right-wing voters. Standard 
errors are again adjusted for clustering on the county level. 
The crucial and fundamentally untestable assumption underlying the wage and 
employment estimates is that discriminatory employers become more frequent when more 
individuals vote for right-wing parties. While this assumption is not unrealistic, it need not 
hold necessarily as changes in the number of right-wing voters could entirely be driven by 
changes in the attitudes of non-business owners. In that case, we would expect the estimates 
for τ to be biased towards zero, which still allows us to interpret them as lower bounds of the 
true effects. 
Results from the wage regressions can be found in table 4 for the whole sample and 
table 5 for the skill-group specific estimates. From table 4, we see mixed results for the 
foreigner-native-wage differential: While the results for women suggest a 0.6% to 1% decline 
in wages for a percentage point increase in the share of right-wing voters, the male results 
suggest the exact opposite. Table 5 reveals that this latter result is driven by a non-significant 
positive effect for low-skilled and skilled workers, while high-skilled male workers suffer 
non-trivial wage penalties of 1.8% and 2.7% per percentage point increase in the share of 
right-wing voters. For women, we also see negative wage effects for skilled workers and even   16
larger effects than those found for men when looking at high-skilled women. Note that the 
stronger effects found for higher skill-groups can be explained by the fact that these are more 
often paid outside of collective bargaining agreements, which makes their wages depend less 
on institutional factors. 
(TABLES 4 AND 5 ABOUT HERE.) 
Before discussing these estimates in greater details, consider first the employment 
estimates in table 6. The results for the employment shares of natives point into a similar 
direction as the wage estimates: Regardless of the measure of discrimination used, employers 
tend to hire less foreigners and more natives whenever the number of right-wing voters rises. 
However, the estimated effects are generally small in economic terms as a one percentage 
point increase in the share of right-wing voters changes native employment shares by only 0.1 
to 0.2 percentage points.  
(TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE.) 
These results are broadly in line with the predictions of Becker’s theory. However, 
given that changes in the number of right-wing votes should be most informative about very 
prejudiced individuals, while only the prejudice of the marginal employer should matter for 
equilibrium wage (or employment) differentials, it is puzzling that we actually observe these 
differentials. From table 3, we see that the average share of foreigners in a county is about 7%, 
whereas the average share of right-wing voters lies – depending on the measure – between 
0.7% and 1%. Taken at face value, these numbers suggest that foreigners should be able to 
avoid discriminatory employers and the associated wage penalties by simply working for 
other, unprejudiced employers. A possible explanation for the estimation results could be that 
changes in the number of right-wing voters also capture changes in attitudes towards 
foreigners over the whole distribution of prejudices. As already pointed out earlier, there is 
some supporting evidence from political scientists (e.g., Arzheimer and Carter, 2006) that the 
ideological positions of mainstream parties are correlated with the vote shares of extreme   17
right-wing parties. Hence, it seems possible that a higher number of right-wing voters is 
simply the (observed) tip of the iceberg of underlying raises in prejudice.  
IV. Plant segregation 
Segregated workplaces or plants can arise through two theoretical channels. First, 
there may be co-workers discrimination. If native workers are prejudiced against foreigners, 
they will demand higher wages whenever they are forced to work along members of the 
minority group. For a color-blind employer it then becomes optimal to create a segregated 
workforce by either hiring only foreigners or only natives. Second, segregation of this type 
can also arise through employer discrimination as non-discriminatory would simply hire the 
cheaper workers (often foreigners) and discriminatory employers would hire either only 
natives if foreigners’ wages were too high or only foreigners if the wages of foreigners 
relative to natives are so low that hiring them pays even for discriminatory employers. The 
key testable prediction from this idea is that plants should become more homogeneous when a 
certain region becomes more prejudiced.  
To test this prediction I create two measures of firm homogeneity. The first 
distinguishes only between foreigners and natives and treats a plant as maximally 
heterogeneous if its workforce consists of 50% foreigners and 50% natives. Such cases are 
assigned an index value of zero. Plants that employ either 100% foreigners or 100% natives 
are considered to be maximally homogenous and are assigned an index value of 100. A one 
point increase in the index equals a 0.5% shift from the minority to the majority group in the 
respective plant. 
The second measure of homogeneity also distinguishes between different groups of 
foreigners, specifically the major guest workers nationalities (Turks, Greeks, Italians, 
Spanish/Potuguese, Jugoslawians), Northern Americans/Australians, East Europeans, Polish, 
West Europeans and other foreigners. It is calculated as the Herfindahl-index of the   18
employment shares of the respective nationality groups with 100 being again the value 
associated with maximal homogeneity. 
I then test the prediction whether plants are more homogenous in regions/years where 
there are more right-wing voters. Specifically, I estimate the regression 
Plant homogeneityict = ηi + ζc + β’Xit + δ’Wct + θ*(Bundesland*year) + τ*RWct  + εict   (3) 
where ηi and ζc capture firm and county level heterogeneity, Xit contains the usual 
time-varying firm-level controls, specifically firm age, firm age squared, firm size, firm size 
squared, the shares of women, white- and blue-collar workers, the shares of high- and low-
qualified workers and the shares of workers below 30, between 40 and 54 and above 54 years 
of age. Wct contains the regional control variables described in section II.C. θ is again a set of 
Bundesland-year-interactions. RWct is again either the vote share of right-wing parties or the 
share of right-wing voters in the population in the respective county and election. Interest lies 
again in τ, which tells us about the changes to plant homogeneity when the county becomes 
more or less prejudiced. I also report estimates based on estimating equation (3) without firm 
fixed effects as these capture all time-constant prejudices in a plant’s workforce and a version 
where I allow the effects to differ between industries to account for the possibility. This latter 
specification accounts for the possibility that prejudiced workers sort themselves into certain 
branches where it is more or less likely to meet foreigners. Identical to the previous estimates, 
standard errors are again adjusted for clustering on the county level. The key assumption 
underlying this test is again that the average prejudice of the workforce in a given country is 
positively correlated with the number of right-wing voters in that county. 
Estimation results can be seen in tables 7a and 7b. Note that the results do not differ 
much when different homogeneity measures are used. The estimates without firm fixed 
effects in columns (1) and (2) generally suggest that plants become more homogeneous when 
support for right-wing parties rises, which is in line with the predictions from taste 
discrimination. However, the effects are very small from an economic perspective, as a one   19
percentage point increase in the share of right-wing voters generally leads to changes in 
homogeneity by about 0.12 to 0.33, which is quite small compared to mean index values of 92 
and 94 respectively. Looking at the fixed effects estimates in columns (3) and (4) strengthens 
this picture as the effects become even smaller and consequently insignificant. 
(TABLES 7a AND 7b ABOUT HERE.) 
While this evidence seems to contradict the predictions from taste discrimination, 
there is a potential problem with these estimates, specifically the possibility that prejudiced 
workers select themselves into certain industries to minimize their exposure to foreigners 
either as co-workers or as customers. In fact, we can imagine that the possibility to encounter 
foreigners as customers is particularly unpleasant for a prejudiced worker as he is to some 
degree forced to interact with them and treat them politely, whereas he can ignore foreign co-
workers more easily. A related point is the fact that plants in some industries, e.g., in 
gastronomy, are predominantly owned by foreigners, which should create another incentive 
for prejudiced workers to select out of the respective industry. If such selection effects play a 
large role, it might very well be the case that most prejudiced workers are found in industries 
without much public exposure and where businesses are not predominantly foreign-owned, 
e.g., in manufacturing or construction, whereas more tolerant workers can be found in 
services and gastronomy. 
Looking at columns (5) and (6) actually confirms these conjectures. Manufacturing 
(the base alternative) and even more so construction plants become more homogenous 
whenever support for right wing parties rises, while these effects are much smaller in 
gastronomy and in particular in services. In fact, if we look at the combination of the main 
and interaction effects, the effects are essentially zero in business services and also relatively 
small in other services and gastronomy. In manufacturing and construction, however, the 
results are also economically large with one percentage point increases in the share of right-
wing voters leading to increases in the homogeneity indices by 0.72 to 1.48 in manufacturing   20
and to increases between 1.06 and 2.33 in construction. To gain an impression of the size of 
the effects, consider the case of manufacturing and a one percentage point increase in the 
share of right-wing voters. This change would lead to a redistribution of employment shares 
from the minority to the majority group by between 0.35 and 0.75 percentage points, which is 
a rather large effect given the relative crudeness of the discrimination measure. 
V. Public contact and foreigner-native wage and employment differentials 
In this section, I investigate the consequences of customer discrimination. The main 
idea of taste discrimination in this context is that prejudiced customers prefer not to interact 
with foreigners when purchasing goods or services, effectively lowering their willingness-to-
pay in such situations. Consequently, foreigners are relatively less productive in jobs that 
require personal contact, which means that employers would only hire minority workers at 
lower wages or – if that is not possible – not at all when their business requires personal 
contact.  
I test this prediction by estimating wage regressions that incorporate interactions 
between proxies for personal contact – in this case dummies for working in gastronomy/retail 
and in services –, being a foreigner and the shares of right-wing voters. Using firm level data I 
also investigate whether firms higher more natives when their business activities require 
personal contact and regional racism is high. A similar idea was used by Holzer and Ihlanfeldt 
(1998), who looked at black-white wage and employment differentials in firms with 
predominantly white or black customers.  
First, I calculate individual level wage regressions of the form 
Ln(wageict) = ηi + ζc + β’Xit + δ’Wct + θ*(Bundesland*year) + λ*RWct  + 
γ1*gastronomy/retailit + γ2*servicesit +  μ1*(RWct*gastronomy/retailit) + μ2*(RWct*servicesit) 
+  τ1*(RWct*foreignert) + τ2*(RWct*foreignert*gastronomy/retailit)+ 
τ3*(RWct*foreignert*servicesit) + εict.,         (4)   21
where wageict is the monthly real wage of individual i in county c at time t, ηi and ζc 
capture individual and county level heterogeneity, Xit contains the same individual-level 
controls as in equation (1), specifically age, potential experience and education dummies for 
being low-skilled, skilled or high-skilled. Wct contains the usual regional control variables 
described in section II.C. θ is again a set of Bundesland-year-interactions, the γ capture wage 
differentials across industries, the μ allow industry-wage-differentials to be different with the 
level of prejudice and the τ are estimates for the changes in the foreigner-native-wage 
differential in the respective industry when the share of right-wing voters rises. The sample is 
restricted to individuals working in manufacturing, retail/gastronomy and services with 
manufacturing being the base alternative. As gastronomy/retail and services require more 
personal contact than manufacturing, we would expect τ2 and τ3 to be negative. Standard 
errors are again adjusted for clustering on the county level. 
Second, I test for differences in the employment of natives using firm level data and 
estimating the following panel regressions: 
Share of nativesict = ηi + ζc + β’Xit + δ’Wct + θ*(Bundesland*year) + τ1*RWct  +  
τ2*(RWct*gastronomy/retaili) + τ3*(RWct*business servicesi) + τ4*(RWct*personal servicesi) + 
τ5*(RWct*constructioni) + τ6*(RWct*otheri) + εict       ( 5 )  
where ηi and ζc again capture firm and regional heterogeneity, θ contain Bundesland-
year-fixed effects, Wct are the usual county-level control variables and Xit contains the same 
firm-level control variables as in equation (2), specifically firm age, firm age squared, firm 
size, firm size squared, the shares of women, white- and blue-collar workers, the shares of 
high- and low-qualified workers and the shares of workers below 30, between 40 and 54 and 
above 54 years of age. The parameters of interest are τ1 to τ6 that show how the employment 
shares of natives in the respective industries change with the share of right-wing voters in the 
county. The base alternative is again manufacturing. Theoretically, we would expect τ2, τ3 and 
τ3 to be positive as these industries require more personal contact with customers, whereas the   22
expected signs of τ5 and τ6 are unknown. Again, standard errors are adjusted for clustering on 
the county level. 
Results for the wage regressions are displayed in table 8. Here, we observe wage 
penalties for foreigners working in services, but not in gastronomy. In services a one 
percentage point increase in the share of right-wing voters in the county leads to wage 
penalties of approximately 2% to 3% for men and even larger, although insignificant, effects 
for women. The pattern is less clear when looking at wages in gastronomy and retail, where 
the results show a non-significant wage premium for men and an equally non-significant 
wage penalty for women. A potential explanation for this fact is that many restaurants are 
inherently foreign and that even (mild) racists who prefer not to get their hair cut by a 
foreigner might still prefer their Pizza being prepared by an original Italian chef.  
(TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE.) 
Consider now the employment estimates displayed in table 9. Here, the results are 
somewhat more inconclusive. In fact, the results suggest an increase in the share of native 
workers in manufacturing, gastronomy and construction whenever the share of right-wing 
voters rises. Considerably weaker effects are found for service firms and in particular for 
business service firms. However, all estimates effects are generally economically small as one 
percentage point changes in the share of right-wing voters generally leads to very small 
changes of about 0.4 percentage points in the employment share of natives. 
(TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE.) 
Taken together, these results are again broadly in line with the predictions from taste 
discrimination. Similarly to the results in section III, most effects seem to work through 
wages rather than employment. In particular, foreign workers in services seem to be harmed 
by regional prejudice, which is consistent with discrimination by customers. 
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VI. Conclusion 
In this paper, I tested several predictions from taste discrimination, specifically the 
existence of foreigner-native wage and employment differentials, firm segregation and the 
role that customer contact plays for the aforementioned effects. I approximated regional 
prejudice against foreigners by using election data for the vote shares of German right wing, 
anti-foreigner parties and combined these data with a 2% sample of German workers and a 
50% sample of German plants taken from social security. 
My results suggest that (a) foreigner-native wage differentials rise with the share of 
right-wing voters, (b) the exact magnitude of the effects varies between skill groups and by 
gender, the largest effects being found for high-skilled men and women, (c) average 
employment shares of natives vary very little with the share of right-wing voters, (d) 
segregated firms become more common in manufacturing and construction when support for 
right-wing parties rises, while no effects are found for services and gastronomy and (e) the 
negative wage effects are strongest for foreigners working in services, while no effects are 
found in manufacturing and gastronomy. These results broadly confirm the predictions from 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics, individual level 





Log monthly wage  7.60  0.60  0.19  5.12  9.02 
Monthly real wage (2000 prices, 
Euro) 
2292.56 1038.74 347.39  167.13  8246.01 
Foreigner (1 = yes)  0.07  0.25  0.07  0.00  1.00 
Age (years)  39.77  8.28  2.39  25.00  55.00 
Potential experience (years)  21.63  8.70  2.40  1.00  39.00 
No post-school education (1 = 
yes) 
0.15 0.36  0.10  0.00  1.00 
Vocational training (1 = yes)  0.74  0.44  0.11  0.00  1.00 
University graduate (1 = yes)  0.11  0.31  0.07  0.00  1.00 
Male 0.55  0.50  0.00  0.00  1.00 
Right wing voteshare  1.06  1.65  1.35  0.00  8.91 
Share of right-wing voters in 
population 
0.69 1.06  0.87  0.00  5.58 
GNP per head (1000 Euro)  29.76  13.05  3.78  11.24  84.21 
County population  387,726 479,212.  109,530  35,219  3,395,189
Share of employed individuals 
in working age population 
80.22 22.34  6.57  35.72  186.66 
Share of foreigners in county 
population 
10.49 5.80  1.34  0.46 26.04 
Share of men in county 
population 
48.33 0.88  0.30  44.87  50.41 
Share of men below 25 in 
county population 
3.79 0.55  0.20  2.67  6.59 
Share of individuals below 25 in 
county population 
7.51 1.02  0.40  5.49  13.86 
Number of school leavers with 
at most Hauptschul degree 
1347.05 1512.46 357.87  107.00  11207.00 
Voter turnout (%)  79.75  3.60  1.90  64.86  88.78 
No. of individuals  467,440 
No. of observations  958,469 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics, firm level 







92.74 19.30  11.08  0 100 
Herfindahl index of 
nationality groups in plant  
94.46 13.47  7.21  14.86  100 
Share of Germans  93.72  18.21  8.52  0  100 
Firm  age  13.30 9.36  2.51  0 30 
Firm size (no. of employees)  14.76  118.20  25.12  1  41,979 
Share of women  57.58  38.69  13.21  0  100 
Share of full-time workers  55.43  38.00  18.95  0  100 
Share of white-collar   29.83  35.39  14.92  0  100 
Share of blue-collar workers   15.63  28.23  11.57  0  100 
Share of high-qualified 
workers 
3.95 14.22  5.88  0  100 
Share of low-qualified 
workers 
12.99 24.18  12.19  0 100 
Share of workers below 30 
years of age 
23.40 28.57  15.63  0 100 
Share of workers between 45 
and 54 years of age 
21.43 27.80  17.20  0 100 
Share of workers above 54 
years of age 
15.70 26.40  13.92  0 100 
Right wing voteshare  0.89  1.57  1.42  0.00  8.91 
Share of right-wing voters in 
population 
0.57 1.01  0.92  0.00  5.58 
GNP per head (1000 Euro)  27.22  11.55  1.60  11.24  84.21 
County population  441,892.69 671,968.88  5,497.50  35,219  3,395,189
Share of employed 
individuals in working age 
population 
75.39 20.09  1.96  35.72  186.66 
Share of foreigners in county 
population 
9.54 5.37  0.33  0.46  26.04 
Share of men in county 
population 
48.48 0.84  0.18  44.87  50.41 
Share of men below 25  in 
county population 
3.83 0.53  0.18  2.67  6.59 
Share of individuals below 
25 in county population 
7.56 0.97  0.35  5.49  13.86 
Number of school leavers 
with at most Hauptschul 
degree 
1564.89 2263.61  106.59  107.00  11207.00 
Voter turnout (%)  79.74  3.54  1.86  64.86  88.78 
No. of firms 
No. of observations 
974,091 
2,473,757   29 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics, county level 




Min. Max.  Data  source 
Right wing voteshare  1.14  1.73  1.66  0  8.91  Official election results 
Share of right-wing voters in 
population 
0.73 1.09  1.05  0  5.58  Official  election  results,  Fortschreibung des 
Bevölkerungsbestandes 
GNP per head (1000 Euro)  24.68  9.83  1.74  11.245  84.21  Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung,  Fortschreibung des 
Bevölkerungsbestandes 
County population  194,309  227,863  3,554.8  35,219  3,398,822  Fortschreibung des Bevölkerungsbestandes 
Share of employed individuals in 
working age population 
73.35 21.10  2.31 35.72  186.66  Erwerbstätigenrechnung des Bundes und der Länder, 
Fortschreibung des Bevölkerungsbestandes 
Share of foreigners in county 
population 
7.61 4.65  0.33  0.46  26.04  Fortschreibung des Bevölkerungsbestandes 
Share of men in county population  48.60  0.85  0.19  44.87  50.41  Fortschreibung des Bevölkerungsbestandes 
Share of men below 25  in county 
population 
3.96 0.57  0.20  2.67  6.59  Fortschreibung des Bevölkerungsbestandes 
Share of individuals below 25 in 
county population 
7.71 1-07  0.39  5.49  13.86  Fortschreibung des Bevölkerungsbestandes 
Number of school leavers with at most 
Hauptschul degree 
765.97 761.60  60.26  107  12,223  Statistik der allgemein bildenden Schulen 
Voter turnout (%)  79.32  4.10  2.14  64.86  88.79  Official election results 
No. of counties  386   
No. of observations  1155   
Only counties with complete information on all variables.   30
Table 4: Right-wing voters and foreigner-native wage differentials, individual level estimates, 
dependent variable: ln(monthly wages in 2000 prices) 
 Men Women 
 Vote  share Population  share Vote share Population  share
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Right wing share  0.0008  -0.0006  0.0025  0.0028 
 (0.0018)  (0.0028)  (0.0020)  (0.0031) 
Right wing share*  0.0056***  0.0087***  -0.0067*** -0.0100*** 
foreigner (0.0013)  (0.0019)  (0.0022)  (0.0034) 
Individual fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes 
County fixed effects  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Industry fixed effects   
(2- digit) 
yes yes yes yes 
Bundesland*year  
interactions 
yes yes yes yes 
No. of individuals  249,404  218,036 
No. of observations  528,329  430,140 
Coefficients, standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on the 
county level. */**/*** denote statistical significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level. All 
estimates contain controls for age, potential experience, education dummies and the following 
county level variables: GNP per head, the county population, the share of employed 
individuals in the working age population, the shares of foreigners, men, men below 25 and 
individuals below 25, the number of school leavers with at most a Hauptschul degree and the 
voter turnout of the respective election. Full estimation results can be found in table A.1 in the 
appendix.   31 
Table 5: Right-wing voters and foreigner-native wage differentials by skill groups, individual level estimates, dependent variable: ln(monthly wages 
in 2000 prices) 
 Men  Women 
 Low-skilled  Skilled  High-skilled  Low-skilled  Skilled  High-skilled 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
Right wing vote share  -.0017    -.0016    -.0029    .0048    .0016    -.0074   
  (.0032)    (.0014)    (.0061)    (.0043)    (.0026)   (0.0133)  
Right wing vote   .00016    .0011    -0.0179***    .0015    -.0082**    -0.0252*   
share*foreigner  (.0018)    (.0014)    (.0059)    .0034    (.0034)   (0.0134)  
Share of right-wing     -.0036    -.0037    -.0041    .0058    .0000    -0.0141 
voters in population    (.0048)    (.0023)    (.0092)    (.0068)    (.0043)    (0.0211) 
Share of right-wing     .0003    .0018    -
0.0273*** 
 .0024   -
0.0124** 
 -0.0377* 
voters in population 
*foreigner 
 (.0027)  (.0022)    (.0090)  (.0052)  (.0052)   (0.0203) 
Individual  fixed  effects  yes yes yes yes  yes  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
County fixed effects  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Industry fixed effects (2 
digit) 
yes yes yes yes  yes  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Bundesland*year 
interactions 
yes yes yes yes  yes  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
No. of individuals  43,732  182,208  35,925  42,098  164,958  20,134 
No. of observations  76,114  381,670  70,545  70,607  324,560  34,973 
Coefficients, standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on the county level. */**/*** denote statistical significance 
on the 10%, 5% and 1% level. All estimates contain controls for age, potential experience, education dummies and the following county level 
variables: GNP per head, the county population, the share of employed individuals in the working age population, the shares of foreigners, men, 
men below 25 and individuals below 25, the number of school leavers with at most a Hauptschul degree and the voter turnout of the respective 
election. Full estimation results can be found in table A.1 in the appendix.   32
Table 6: Right-wing voters and labor demand for natives, plant level regressions estimates, 
dependent variable: share of Germans employed 
 Linear  Regression 
 (1)  (2) 
Vote share of right parties  0.0897**   
 (0.0402)   
Share of right voters in     0.01745*** 
population   (0.0622) 
Firm fixed effects  no  no 
County fixed effects  yes  yes 






No. of plants  974,091 
No. of observations  2,473,757 
Coefficients, standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on the 
county level. */**/*** denote statistical significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level. All 
estimates contain controls for firm age, firm age squared, firm size, firm size squared, the 
shares of women, white- and blue-collar workers, the shares of high- and low-qualified 
workers, the shares of workers below 30, between 40 and 54 and above 54 years of age as 
well as the following county level variables: GNP per head, the county population, the share 
of employed individuals in the working age population, the shares of foreigners, men, men 
below 25 and individuals below 25, the number of school leavers with at most a Hauptschul 
degree and the voter turnout of the respective election. Full estimation results can be found in 
table A.2 in the appendix.   33 
Table 7a: Plant segregation, plant level regressions, dependent variable: native-foreigner-homogeneity-index 
 Linear  Regressions  Plant fixed effects regressions 
 Vote  share Population  share Vote  share Population  share Vote  share Population  share 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Right wing share (base: manufacturing)  0.0016**  0.0032***  0.0296  0.0973  0.9088***  1.4883*** 
 (0.0772)  (0.1228)  (0.0434)  (0.0697) (0.2285)  (0.3769) 
Right wing share * Retail/restaurants/bars        -0.3504  -0.6185 
        (0.3207)  (0.5136) 
Right wing share * Business services          -1.0863***  -1.7935*** 
        (0.3022)  (0.4972) 
Right wing share * Personal/social services          -0.5442*  -0.9303* 
        (0.3185)  (0.5248) 
Right wing share * Construction          0.4889  0.8445* 
        (0.3075)  (0.5055) 
Right wing share * Other          -0.8954***  -1.4152*** 
        (0.2262)  (0.3741) 
Individual fixed effects  no  no  yes  yes  yes  yes 
County fixed effects  no  no  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Industry fixed effects (2 digit)  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Bundesland*year  interactions  yes yes  yes yes  yes  yes 
No. of firms  974,091 
No. of observations  2,473,757 
Coefficients, standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on the county level. */**/*** denote statistical significance 
on the 10%, 5% and 1% level. All estimates contain controls for firm age, firm age squared, firm size, firm size squared, the shares of women, 
white- and blue-collar workers, the shares of high- and low-qualified workers, the shares of workers below 30, between 40 and 54 and above 54 
years of age as well as the following county level variables: GNP per head, the county population, the share of employed individuals in the working 
age population, the shares of foreigners, men, men below 25 and individuals below 25, the number of school leavers with at most a Hauptschul 
degree and the voter turnout of the respective election. Full estimation results can be found in table A.2 in the appendix. 
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Table 7b: Plant segregation, plant level regressions, dependent variable: Herfindahl index of nationality groups in plant 
 Linear  Regressions  Plant fixed effects regressions 
 Vote  share Population  share Vote  share Population  share Vote  share Population  share 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Right wing share (base: manufacturing)  0.1157**  0.2276**  0.0287  0.0851  0.7210***  1.1805*** 
 (0.0575)  (0.0915)  (0.0332)  (0.0534) (0.1552)  (0.2553) 
Right wing share * Retail/restaurants/bars        -0.5506**  -0.9278** 
        (0.2234)  (0.3594) 
Right wing share * Business services          -0.7532***  -1.2464*** 
        (0.21.06)  (0.3454) 
Right wing share * Personal/social services          -0.4901**  -0.8311** 
        (0.2229)  (0.3695) 
Right wing share * Construction          0.3398*  0.5888* 
        (0.2030)  (0.3336) 
Right wing share * Other          -0.7028***  -1.1109*** 
        (0.1539)  (0.2538) 
Individual fixed effects  no  no  yes  yes  yes  yes 
County fixed effects  no  no  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Industry fixed effects (2 digit)  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Bundesland*year  interactions  yes yes  yes yes  yes  yes 
No. of firms  974,091 
No. of observations  2,473,757 
Coefficients, standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on the county level. */**/*** denote statistical significance 
on the 10%, 5% and 1% level. All estimates contain controls for firm age, firm age squared, firm size, firm size squared, the shares of women, 
white- and blue-collar workers, the shares of high- and low-qualified workers, the shares of workers below 30, between 40 and 54 and above 54 
years of age as well as the following county level variables: GNP per head, the county population, the share of employed individuals in the working 
age population, the shares of foreigners, men, men below 25 and individuals below 25, the number of school leavers with at most a Hauptschul 
degree and the voter turnout of the respective election. Full estimation results can be found in table A.2 in the appendix.   35
Table 8: Right-wing voters and foreigner-native wage differentials by public contact, 
individual level estimates, dependent variable: ln(monthly wages in 2000 prices) 
 Men Women 
 Vote  share Population  share Vote  share Population  share 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Right wing share 
(base: manufacturing) 
.0011 .0011  .00015  -.0014 
  (.0016) (.0024) (.0042) (.0067) 
Right wing share * 
foreigner 
.0012 .0018 -.0054  -.0083 
  (.0011) (.0017) (.0042) (.0065) 
Right wing share * 
Retail/restaurants/bars 
-0.0137*** -0.0213***  .0085***  0.0130*** 
  (.0022) (.0033) (.0024) (.0038) 
Right wing share * 
services 
-0.0182*** -0.0279  .0013  .0018 
  (.0021) (.0032) (.0035) (.0055) 
Retail/restaurants/bars 
* foreigner 
-.0003 -.0003 -.0001 -.0001 
  (.0004) (.0004) (.0004) (.0004) 
Services * foreigner  .0002  .0002  -.0004  -.0004 
  (.0004) (.0004) (.0007) (.0007) 
Right wing share * 
Retail/restaurants/bars 
* foreigner 
.0072 0.0116 -.0060 -.0088 
  (0.0108)  (0.0164) (.0093) (0.0140) 
Right wing share * 
services * foreigner 
-0.0281** -0.0327**  -0.0262  -0.0382 
 (.0098)  (0.0151)  (0.0204)  (0.0317) 
Individual fixed 
effects 
yes yes yes yes 
County fixed effects  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Industry fixed effects  
(2- digit) 
yes yes yes yes 
Bundesland*year  
interactions 
yes yes yes yes 
No. of individuals  90,739  49,956 
No. of observations  185,779  91,631 
Coefficients, standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on the 
county level. */**/*** denote statistical significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level. All 
estimates contain controls for age, potential experience, education dummies and the following 
county level variables: GNP per head, the county population, the share of employed 
individuals in the working age population, the shares of foreigners, men, men below 25 and 
individuals below 25, the number of school leavers with at most a Hauptschul degree and the 
voter turnout of the respective election.   36
Table 9: Employment shares of natives by industry, plant level estimates, dependent variable: 
share of Germans 
  Plant fixed effects regressions 
 Vote  share Population  share 
 (1)  (2) 
Right wing share (base: manufacturing)  0.4371***  0.7281*** 
 (0.1519)  (0.2475) 
Right wing share* retail/restaurants/bars -0.0127  -0.0643 
 (0.2071)  (0.3350) 
Right wing share * business services  -0.6845***  -1.1191*** 
 (0.2318)  (0.3752) 
Right wing share * personal services  -0.2750  -0.4658 
 (0.1754)  (0.2852) 
Right wing share * construction  0.2639  0.4674 
 (0.2096)  (0.3475) 
Right wing share * other  -0.4495***  -0.7386*** 
 (0.1506)  (0.2459) 
Plant fixed effects  yes  yes 
County fixed effects  yes  yes 
Industry fixed effects (2 digit)  yes  yes 
Bundesland*year interactions  yes  yes 
No. of firms  974,091 
No. of observations  2,473,757 
Coefficients, standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on the 
county level. */**/*** denote statistical significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level. All 
estimates contain controls for firm age, firm age squared, firm size, firm size squared, the 
shares of women, white- and blue-collar workers, the shares of high- and low-qualified 
workers, the shares of workers below 30, between 40 and 54 and above 54 years of age as 
well as the following county level variables: GNP per head, the county population, the share 
of employed individuals in the working age population, the shares of foreigners, men, men 
below 25 and individuals below 25, the number of school leavers with at most a Hauptschul-
degree and the voter turnout of the respective election.  
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